Why the Japanese don't want to make babies (2024)

After hovering around zero growth in the late 2000s, Japan’s population has been shrinking since 2010, with the decline accelerating in recent years. Breaking its own record every year for the last 10 years, the country experienced anotherrecord population loss of 644,000in 2020–2021.

Japan’s population isprojected to shrinkwell into the middle of this century, dropping to an estimated 88 million in 2065 — a 30% decline in 45 years.

Japan’s rapid population shrinkage is primarily caused by persistently low fertility. Japan’s fertility rate has been declining since the mid-1970s, reaching a total fertility rate (TFR) of around 1.3 children per woman in the early 2000s. Japan’s TFR hit a low of 1.26 in 2005, but there was amodest recoveryto a TFR of around 1.4 in the 2010s.

There is little out-of-wedlock childbearing in Japan. Childbirths outside of marriage have constituted around 2% of all births since the 1950s. The decline in Japan’s fertility rate is mainly due to fewer young women getting married.

While the proportion of never-married women at their peak reproductive age of 25‒34 had been stable until the mid-1970s, the proportion of single women aged 25–29 jumped from 21% in 1975 to 66% in 2020. The corresponding proportion of women aged 30–34 saw aneven more dramaticjump from 8% to 39%.

Young Japanese women are increasingly reluctant to marry and have children in part due to the rapid improvement of their economic opportunities. Women’s participation in four-year college degrees began to rise rapidly in thelate-1980sand reached 51% in 2020.

The employment rate of young women also increased significantly. The labor participation rate of women aged 25–29almost doubledfrom 45% in 1970 to 87% in 2020.

Japan’s declining marriage rate is also attributable to the persistence of traditional domesticgender roles, which place a heavy burden on women to manage housework and childcare. Japanese men’s contributions to domestic tasksremain very lowand the gender imbalance in domestic labor is still notable.

The persistence of unequalgender rolesat home in the face of expanding economic opportunities for women has made balancing work and family life very difficult for married women — lessening the appeal of marriage.

Out of concern about the social and economic consequences associated with prolonged low fertility and rapid population aging, the Japanese government launched aseries of programsaddressing low fertility (‘shoushika-taisaku’) in the mid-1990s.

The initial focus was to provide parenting assistance through increasing the provision of childcare services and advocating for a better work-life balance.

Alarmed by the slippage of fertility rates and the onset of population decline in the late 2000s, Japan’s policy efforts have become more comprehensive. Japanese governments have advocated forlong-term policy assistancefrom birth to young adulthood.

In the 2010s, low fertility became an integral part of Japan’s overall public policy direction. Low fertility policies were incorporated into Japan’s macroeconomic policy, national land planning and regional and local development.

Despite these continuous and comprehensive efforts to increase the fertility rate, Japan’s policies have fallen short of achieving increases in fertility that would mitigate the social and economic effects of population decline and aging.

Still, Japan’s policies have halted a further slide in the fertility rate. Unlike other East Asian economies such asSouth KoreaandTaiwan, whose TFR in 2021 dwindled to 0.81 and 1.07, respectively, Japan’s rate remained at 1.30.

Japan’s experience shows how difficult it is to restore fertility to the replacement level, especially when a country has a sizable population and a persistently low birth rate.

It also seems unrealistic to counter Japan’s rapid population decline through an immediate and drastic increase in international migration by liberalizing the country’simmigration policies. The number of deaths in Japan is expected to rise in thenext few decadesowing to increases in the elderly population.

That means the country has no choice but to strengthen efforts to sustain and, hopefully, boost fertility. To do this, Tokyo should help women and couplesbalance their work and family rolesto lighten the heavy social and economic costs associated with population decline.

Japan’s labor market needs to become more family-friendly, while gender roles at home must become less traditional. Even if policy efforts to make the workplace more family-friendly and the home more gender-equal fail to raise fertility and slow population decline, they will likely improve the well-being of Japanese families by improving the quality of family life.

Noriko Tsuya is Distinguished Professor at Keio University.

Thisarticle, republished with permission, was first published byEast Asia Forum, which is based out of theCrawford School of Public Policywithin theCollege of Asia and the Pacificat theAustralian National University.